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Phenomenological arrows of time can be traced to a past low-entropy state. Does this imply the
universe was in an improbable state in the past? I suggest a different possibility: past low-entropy
depends on the coarse-graining implicit in our definition of entropy. This, in turn depends on our
physical coupling to the rest of the world. I conjecture that any generic motion of a sufficiently rich
system satisfies the second law of thermodynamics, in either direction of time, for some choice of
macroscopic observables. The low entropy of the past could then be due to the way we couple to
the universe (a way needed for us doing what we do), hence to our natural macroscopic variables,
rather than to a strange past microstate of the world at large.
I. INTRODUCTION
The second law of thermodynamics states that entropy
does not decrease in time. This is not in contradiction
with the time (more precisely, CPT) reversal invariance
of the microscopic laws, because we use the second law
to study the evolution of states with initial low entropy.
Fixing the initial conditions is what breaks time rever-
sal symmetry. But why do we use initial conditions, if
microphysics is time reversal invariant?
The reason is that the world we inhabit is strongly
time-asymmetric: observed phenomena display marked
and consistent arrows of time. The discussion about the
interpretation of this fact has been extensive, and I am
not going to recall it here; the conclusion is that there
is substantial consensus that all arrows of time can be
traced to the fact (or repressed as the statement) that
the world at large had low entropy in the past (see for
instance [1]). We live in a universe with continuous abun-
dant entropy production. Here I take this conclusion for
granted and consider a further question: why was the
entropy of the world low in the past?
Is it because the universe happened to be born in a
very peculiar microstate? (For a recent discussion in the
context of cosmology see for instance [2].) Is it because of
some not yet known fundamental law, for instance Roger
Penrose’s hypothesis that initial singularities (but not
final ones) have vanishing Weil curvature [3]?
Here I suggest a different possibility. The entropy of a
system depends on the determination of a set of macro-
scopic observables An, namely on a “coarse-graining” of
the microscopic state space of the system. I suggest that
the past entropy of the world was not low because of its
microstate being peculiar: rather, it is the coarse grain-
ing we use to describe it that makes its entropy low.
More precisely, I consider the following:
Conjecture: Any generic microscopic motion of a suffi-
ciently rich system satisfies the second law (in ei-
ther time direction) for a suitable choice of macro-
scopic observables.
Below I give some argument supporting the plausibility
of this conjecture. If the conjecture holds, then we have
a new way for facing the puzzle of the arrow of time: the
universe was not in any special state in the past; rather,
the universe is sufficiently rich to admit a description in
terms of coarse grained observables with respect to which
entropy increases.
Now, the choice of coarse graining in the thermody-
namical description of a system is not free: it depends on
the system’s couplings. A system that couples to the rest
of the universe via macroscopic variables for which en-
tropy was low in the past interacts with a universe which
is strongly time oriented. As we do. Such a coupling
might therefore characterize subsystems where informa-
tion gathering creatures such as ourselves can exist.
Entropy increase, and therefore all phenomena related
to time flow, might follow not from a peculiarity of the
microstate of the universe, but from the peculiarities of
our coupling to the rest of the universe.
II. THE CONJECTURE
I start by making the formulation of the conjecture a
bit more precise. I introduce it using classical mechanics,
namely disregarding quantum theory. I extend it to the
quantum theory in the last section. Quantum theory, I
think, reinforces the plausibility of the idea, but the clas-
sical picture is more clear. In this context it is convenient
to use Gibbs’ formulation of statistical mechanics rather
than Boltzmann’s, because the Boltzmann’s formulation
takes for granted the split of a system in a large number
of equal subsystems (the individual particles), and this
may not be the right way of thinking in quantum field
theory, where the story becomes in fact more interesting.
Consider a classical system with many degrees of free-
dom, in a (“microscopic”) state s, element of a phase
space Γ, evolving in time as s(t). Let An, be a set of
(“macroscopic”) observables –real functions on Γ–, la-
beled by the index n. Given s and An, (micro canonical)
entropy can be defined as the logarithm of the number
of states that have the same An’s values as s. If phase
space is continuous, with a (time invariant) measure ds,
2entropy is then
Ss,An = log
∫
Γ
ds′
∏
n
δ(An(s
′)−An(s)). (1)
Notice that this definition applies to any microstate.1
As the microstate s evolves in time so does entropy
Ss,An(t) ≡ Ss(t),An . (2)
The conjecture states that if the system is sufficiently
complex and ergodic, for most paths s(t) that satisfy the
dynamics and for each choice of a direction in t, there is
a family of observables An such that
dSs,An
dt
≥ 0. (3)
In other words, any motion appears to have initial low
entropy (and then non decreasing entropy) under some
coarse graining.
III. BALLS IN A BOX
A simple example illustrates the conjecture. Consider
a set Σ of N distinguishable balls that move in a box,
governed by a time reversible and sufficiently ergodic dy-
namics. Let the box have an extension x ∈ [−1, 1] in
the direction of the x coordinate, and let it be ideally
divided in two halves by x = 0. For any subset of balls
σ ⊂ Σ define the observable Aσ to be the mean value of
the x coordinate of the balls in σ. That is, if xb is the x
coordinate of the ball b, define
Aσ =
∑
b∈σ xb∑
b∈σ 1
. (4)
Let s(t) be a generic actual motion of the system, say
going from t = ti to t = tf . Let σi be the set of the balls
that are at the left of x = 0 at t = ti. The macroscopic
observable Ai ≡ Aσi defines an entropy that in the large
N limit and for most motions s(t) satisfies
Ss,Ai(t)
dt
≥ 0. (5)
This is the second law of thermodynamics. Notice that
it holds for a generic motion s(t).
Given the same motion s(t), we can define a different
observable as follows. Let σf be the set of the balls that
1 This equation defines entropy up to an an additive factor, be-
cause phase space volume has the dimension of [Action]N , where
N is the number of degrees of freedom. This incompleteness is
settled by quantum theory, which introduces the natural unit
of action, the Planck constant, whose physical meaning is to
determine the minimum empirically distinguishable phase space
volume, namely the maximal amount of information in a state.
See [4].
are at the left of x = 0 at t = tf . The macroscopic
observable Af ≡ Aσf defines an entropy that satisfies
Ss,Af (t)
dt
≤ 0. (6)
This is again second law of thermodynamics, but now
in the reversed time −t. It holds for the same (generic)
motion s(t), but a different observable family.
This is pretty obvious on physical grounds: if at initial
time we ideally color in red all the balls at the left of x = 0
then the initial state is low entropy with the respect to
the coarse graining given by color, and most motions are
going to mix the balls and raise the entropy.
The point is simple: for any motion there is a macro-
scopic family of observables with respect to which the
state at a chosen end of the motion is low entropy. I call
these observables, “time oriented observables”. These
observable are easily determined by the state itself.
IV. OBSERVABLES ARE INTERACTIONS
The fact that thermodynamics and statistical mechan-
ics require a coarse graining, namely a “choice” of macro-
scopic observables, appears at first sight to introduce a
curious element of subjectivity into physics, clashing with
the objectivity of the predictions of science.
But of course there is nothing subjective in thermody-
namics. A cup of hot tea does not cool down because
of what I know or do not know about its molecules.
The “choice” of macroscopic observables is dictated by
the ways the system under consideration couples. The
macroscopic observables of the system are those coupled
to the exterior (in thermodynamics, those that can be
manipulated and macroscopically measured). The ther-
modynamics and the statistical mechanics of a system
defined by a set of macroscopic observables An describes
(objectively) the way the system interacts when coupled
to another system via these observables.
For instance, the behavior of a box full of air is going
to be described by a certain entropy function if the air is
interacting with the exterior via a piston that changes its
volume V . But the same air is going to be described by
a different entropy function if it interacts with the exte-
rior via two pistons with filters permeable to Oxygen and
Nitrogen respectively. In this case, the macroscopic ob-
servables are others and a chemical potential enters the
game. It is not our abstract “knowledge” about the rela-
tive abundance of Oxygen and Nitrogen that matters: it
is the presence or not of a physical coupling of this quan-
tity to the exterior to determine which entropy describes
the phenomena. Different statistics and thermodynamics
of the same box of air describe different interactions of
the box with the exterior.
In light of this consideration, let us reconsider the box
of the previous section replacing the abstract notion of
“observable” by a concrete interaction between subsys-
tems. This is done in the next Section.
3V. TIME-ORIENTED SUBSYSTEMS
Say we have the N balls in a box as above, but now we
add a new set of 2N “small” balls2, with negligible mass,
that do not interact among themselves but interact with
the previous (“large”) balls as follows. Each small ball is
labeled by a subset σ ⊂ Σ and is attracted by the balls
in σ and only these, via a force law such that the total
attraction is in the direction of the center of mass Aσ of
the balls in σ.
Thus, generically a small ball interacts with a large
number of large balls, but it does so only via a single vari-
able: Aσ. Therefore it interacts with a thermodynamical
system, for which Aσ is the macroscopic observable. For
each small ball σ, the “rest of the universe” behaves as a
thermal system with entropy Ss,Aσ .
As shown above, given a generic motion s(t) there will
generically be at least one small ball, the ball σi for which
the entropy of the rest of the box is never decreasing in
t (in the thermodynamical limit of large N).
To make the example more intuitively compelling,
imagine now that the box is the universe and each
“small” ball σ is itself a large system with very many
degrees of freedom. Then generically there is at least
one of these, namely σi (but in fact many) for which the
rest of the universe is seen as having a low-entropy initial
state.
Since σi interacts thermodynamically with a universe
which was in a low-entropy state in the past, the world
seen by σi appears organized in time: observed phenom-
ena display marked and consistent arrows of time, which
single out one direction. σi interacts with a world where
entropy increases, hence “time flows” in one specific di-
rection. The world seen by σi may include dissipation,
memory, traces of the past, and all the many phenomena
that characterize the universe as we see it. Within such
subsystem σi time oriented phenomena that require the
growth of entropy, such as evolution or accumulation of
knowledge, can take place.
I call such a subsystem a “time oriented subsystem”.
Could this picture be related to the reason why we see
the universe as a system with a low-entropy initial state?
Could the low entropy of the universe characterize our
own coupling with the universe, rather than a peculiarity
of the microstate of the universe?
VI. STRUCTURE FORMATION
If the hypothesis put forward in the previous section
hold, we may ask how come we happen to be part of
a special subsystem that couples in a peculiar manner.
2 2N is the number of subsets of Σ, namely the cardinality of its
power set.
There is a natural answer: because this is the precondi-
tion for us to be what we are, in a wide sense. We live in
time, our existence depends strongly on entropy produc-
tion. Innumerable aspects of our own existence depends
on the fact of being in a situation of local strong entropy
production: biological evolution, biochemistry, life itself,
memory, knowledge acquisition, culture... Being part of
a time oriented subsystem could simply be the condition
for all this?
A (loose) analogy: we live in a region of the universe
with liquid water. Would it make sense to ask for a reason
why we are in such an unusual place? The answer is
clearly no: we are that sort of things that develop where
liquid water is. So, our inhabiting theses quarters of the
universe is no more strange than me being born in a place
where people happen to speak my own language.
Consider the thermodynamical framework of life on
Earth. There is a constant flow of electromagnetic energy
on Earth: incoming radiation from the Sun and outgoing
radiation towards the sky. Microscopically, this is a cer-
tain complicated solution of Maxwell equation, whatever
this is. But as far as life is considered, most details of
this solution (such as the precise phase of a single solar
photon falling on the Pacific ocean) are irrelevant.
What matters are energy and frequency integrated
over small regions. Now the incoming energy is the same
as the outgoing energy, but not so for the frequency. The
Earth receives energy E (from the Sun) at higher fre-
quency νi and emits energy (towards the sky) at lower
frequency νf . This is a fact about the actual solution
of the Maxwell equations in which we happen to live. If
we take energy and frequency as macroscopical observ-
ables, then entropy is defined. Roughly, entropy counts
the number of photons; at frequency ν the number of
photons in a wave of energy E is N = E/~ν. If the re-
ceived energy is emitted at lower frequency, the emitted
entropy Sf is higher than the received entropy Si. The
process produces entropy: Sf ≫ Si. This entropy pro-
duction is not a feature of the solution of the Maxwell
equations alone: it is a feature of this solution and a
set of macroscopic observables (energy and frequency) to
which living systems couple.
Any system on Earth whose dynamics is governed by
interactions with E and ν has a source of negative en-
tropy at its disposal. This is what is exploited by life on
Earth to build structure and organization.
Could it be that entropy growth is not a property of the
universe by itself, but rather a property of the particular
coupling to the rest of the universe that allows us to be
what we are?
VII. THE SUBJECT, THE OBJECT AND
ENVIRONMENT
Any description of the world is based on the availabil-
ity of relevant information about a portion of this world.
Having information about a part of the world implies be-
4ing correlated with that part. Thus information depends
on the existence of a physical correlation between two
systems. For instance I have information on the color
of the sky if there is a certain correlation between the
state of the neurons in my brain and the color of the
sky. This correlation is the information I have about the
sky. An apparatus has information about a variable of
the system because after the measurement the pointer
position is correlated with the value of the variable. A
phone book has information because the position of its
ink’s drop are correlated to the memories of the phone
company’s switches.
The physical notion underlying information is there-
fore Shannon’s relative information
S12 = log[N1 ×N2]− logN12, (7)
which measures the constraint reducing the states avail-
able to a system to a number N12 smaller than the num-
ber of states N1 × N2 in the Cartesian product of the
state spaces of its individual subsystems.
Information is the fact that certain product states (sky
blue and my neurons having an imprint of grey sky, or
sky grey and my neurons having an imprint of blue sky)
are impossible or improbable.
These correlations are established by physical interac-
tions. For instance, I get information about the weather
by opening the window and interacting with the photons
coming from the outside. This interaction determines a
correlation between by neurons and the sky and therefore
establishes information. (I have discussed these points
more in detail in [5].)
Correlations vary because of dynamical interactions
between the two systems and the rest of the world. The
proper setting for statistical considerations is therefore
formed by three (and not two) components, which can
be called (i) the subject, (ii) the object and (iii) the en-
vironment.
The state of the object is described by the macro-
scopic variables. The subject is the part of the world
which interacts with the object and gets correlated with
it, thus holding information (in the sense of Shannon)
about these variables. The environment is the ensemble
of the other variables the object interacts with.
Notice that interactions between the object and the
environment raise entropy, because part of the informa-
tion held by the subject may become irrelevant. While
interactions between the subject and the object lower
the entropy, because new information becomes available.
This triple part structure underlying statistical mechan-
ics and this double mode of evolution of entropy have
been emphasized in particular by Max Tegmark [6].
Past low entropy, therefore, should not be regarded as
a feature of the microstate of the world, but rather as
something pertaining a peculiar split of the world.
VIII. QUANTUM THEORY
Quantum phenomena generate entropy distinct from
the classical one generated by coarse graining: entangle-
ment entropy. The state space of any quantum system
is described by a Hilbert space H, with a linear struc-
ture that plays a major role for physics. If the sys-
tem can be split into two components, its state space
splits into the tensor product of two Hilbert spaces:
H = H1 ⊗ H2, each carrying the corresponding subset
of observables. Because of the linearity, a generic state
is not a tensor product of component states; that is, in
general ψ 6= ψ1 ⊗ ψ2. This is entanglement. Restrict-
ing the observables to those of a subsystem, say system
1, determines a quantum entropy over and above clas-
sical statistical entropy. This is measured by the von
Neumann entropy S = −tr[ρ log ρ] of the density matrix
ρ = trH2 |ψ〉〈ψ|.
The conjecture above can be adapted to this case. In
any sufficiently rich quantum system (this means: with a
sufficient complex algebra of observables: remember all
separable Hilbert space are isomorphic), given a generic
state evolving in time as ψ(t), there is a split of the sys-
tem into subsystems such that the von Neumann entropy
is low at initial time and increases in time.
The point here is not to assume the tensorial structure
of H a priori. Instead, given a generic state, we can find
a tensorial split of H which sees von Neumann entropy
grow in time.
This is easy to prove. A separable Hilbert space ad-
mits many discrete bases |n〉. Given any ψ ∈ H, we can
always choose a basis |n〉 where ψ = |1〉. Then we can
consider two Hilbert space, H1 and H2, with bases |k〉
and |m〉, and map their tensor product to H by identi-
fying |k〉 ⊗ |m〉 with the state |n〉 where (k,m) appear
in the n-th position of the Cantor ordering of the (n,m)
couples ((1,1),(1,2),(2,1),(1,3),(2,2),(3,1),(1,4)...). Then,
ψ = |1〉 ⊗ |1〉 is a tensor state and has vanishing von
Neumann entropy.
Therefore for any time evolution ψ(t) there is a split
of the system into subsystem such that the initial state
has zero entropy. Then, growing and decreasing of (en-
tanglement) entropy is an issue about how the universe
in split into subsystems, not a feature of the overall state
of things (on this, see again [6]).
Entropic peculiarities of the past state of the universe
should not be searched in the cosmos at large. They
should be searched in the spilt, and therefore the macro-
scopic observables, relevant for us. Time asymmetry, and
therefore “time flow”, might be a feature of a subsystem
to which we belong, features needed for information gath-
ering creatures like us to exist, and not features of the
universe at large.
——
I am indebted to Hal Haggard and Angelo Vulpiani for
discussions and suggestions.
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